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BAdKGROUND
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I
The Stabex system came into being in the political and economic environment
ofthe early seventies. A number offactors paved the wayfor its creation.
There was much talk at the time ofa new international economic order and
the subject was on the agenda ofthe third UNCTAD (United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development) meeting in Santiago, Chile.
The 1973 Yom Kippur war accentuated the demandfor commodities supplied
by developing countries. Aware that the way to control their development was
to establish greater stability and increase their incomefrom the export of
commodities, these countries began to demand stable export earnings more
insistently.
It was also the period during which the arrangements between a large number
ofdeveloping countries, who were to become the ACP States, and the EEC
were to be renegotiated.
The dedsive impetus came with the accession ofthe United Kingdom to the
Community and the arrangements to safeguard the interests ofsugar
producers hitherto represented by the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.
It was clear that these arrangements could not be confined to sugar - which
was covered by a spedalProtocol -but would have to be establishedfor other
commodities tOOl.
In 1975this combination offactors resulted in the creation ofStabex, a
stabilisation system offering the ACP States substantialfunds tofinance their
agricultural sectors when they encountered serious difficulties because offalls
in export earnings, whether these were due tofalling worldprices, natural
disasters or a combination ofthe two.
1. Other products such as beef and veal, rum and bananas were also covered by special protocols.·····1
At the root of this system lies the
recognition that the benefits of growth in
export earnings for commodities do not
suffice to offset the damage done by
contraction, even if the rises and falls
appear to be similar in scale.
Fluctuations in export earnings have disruptive effects
at a number oflevels:
• They cause investment planning
problems.
The economic structures of developing
countries are often too rigid to allow them
to take full advantage of an unexpected
increase in their export earnings. On the
other hand, a sudden fall in these
earnings often leads to the suspension, or
even abandonment, of projects under way.
Tea plantation.
(Rwanda)
• They disturb the internal balance of
public finances. While prices are rising,
governments are inclined to increase
public spending in ways which are
difficult to reverse when prices fall.
The loss of tax revenue then has to be
offset by increasing levies on producers'
earnings or increasing domestic
borrowing.
• The erosion of their incomes can make
producers less inclined to produce export
commodities and so lead to national
export earnings falling even further.
• The balance of payments suffers.
However, experience has shown that the
stabilisation of prices for basic products
does not suffice to guarantee a
stabilisation of the export earnings of
developing countries.
Often the quantities of products exported
fluctuate even more extremely than prices
for a number of reasons, including
variations in demand from industrialised
countries, abnormal weather conditions
and wars.
When working out how to stabilise
earnings, all these factors had to be taken
into account.THE BASIS OF
THE STABEX SYSTEM
Broadly speaking, there are four different ways ofadjusting the export
earnings ofcountries producing basic commodities:
• Interventions on the market
(international agreements and
arrangements) involving the redistribution
of the export market, control of supply
and, possibly, the establishment of buffer
stocks;
• Preferential systems, by definition
geographically limited, based on
guaranteed price systems, particularly in
the form of tariff preferences for
producers in countries which are parties
to the agreement.
• Institutional solutions operating outside
the market, including guaranteed
purchase at guaranteed prices. The
producer countries are paid at a fixed
price for fixed quantities of a product
which they are committed to supplying.
• No intervention on the market, but post
hoc compensation payments to assist
export earnings.
The last of these formulas was the one
chosen. One of its original features is not
to intervene in advance, but after losses
have been recorded, without interfering in
the free play of market forces.
The principle is a simple one: a reference
level is fixed and the beneficiary countries
are guaranteed a transfer of funds
equivalent to all or part of the difference
between the actual value of their exports
and the reference level.
The basis ofthis system was laid down in
Article 16 ofLome I: "With the aim of
remedying the harmful effects ofthe instability
ofexport e~nings and ofthereby enabling the
ACPStates to achieve the stability, profitability
andsustained growth oftheir economies, the
Communityshall implement asystem for
guaranteeing the stabilisation ofearnings from
exports by the ACP States to the Communityof
certain products on which theireconomies are
dependent and which are affectedby
fluctuations in price and/orquantity."
This system, in which there was much
international interest, has now increased
its scope and effectiveness, although the
basic purpose of Stabex is not to act as a
support system for the balance of
payments or to offset budget deficits.
From Lome IV onwards "where, in the
sector for which the transfer is destined,
there is already an adjustment operating
designed to restructure production and
export activities or achieve diversification,
the resources shall be used to second
these efforts and, where necessary,
support any consistent reform policy in
the sector concerned." Lome IV, Article
209(4).
These provisions were strengthened in the
revised Convention which provides that
where there is an adjustment programme
in place, including operations designed to
restmcture production and export
activities, or to achieve diversification, the
resources will be used in conformity with
these efforts and in order to support any
. consistent reform policy.
The Community has made increasing
efforts to negotiate a series of
Conventions, each consolidating and
improving of the achievements of the
previous ones to take as full account as
possible of ACP States' wishes and the
lessons learnt from experience.The Community's aim is thus to contribute
significantly to the beneficiary countries'
establishment of a sounder economic
base, either through safeguarding the
production and export sectors directly
concerned or through diversification of
production.
In addition to the general objective of
supporting the profitability and growth of
ACP economies, the Community also
attaches considerable importance to
contributing to the economic and social
progress of the populations of those
countries by helping to safeguard their
purchasing power, which suffers badly
from falls in prices or production.
The Stabex system was not designed to
stabilise unstable commodity prices.
Its purpose is confined to mitigating the
ill effects of losses of export earnings by
the ACP States when there is a fall in
world prices and/or in exports.
The system only intervenes to alleviate
the effect of non-structural problems such
as fluctuations in world prices or events
beyond the control of producers and
purchasers (e.g. natural disasters).
The basic principle is that Stabex
transfers replace the amounts which
would have been paid to producers if
market conditions had been normal.
But the ultimate objective must focus on
the medium and long term: the primary
aim of transfers must be to support efforts
to improve the underlying conditions of
production in the sector affected by the
fall in export earnings. Sector is used here
in the broad sense, including not only
production, but also processing,
marketing, distribution and transport.
In appropriate cases the system may also
support agricultural diversification.
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Stabex coverage applies as follows:
II A regional system
As a rule, Stabex covers only ACP exports
to the Community. However there are two
types of derogation:
The first allows the Stabex system to be
applied to exports from ACP States to
other ACP States. This derogation was
introduced to encourage intra-ACP trade
(Article 189(2)).
The second concerns ACP countries
which, despite all their efforts, find
themselves in a situation which obliges
them to sell nearly all their exports to
non-Community countries. An "all
destinations" guarantee is granted to
them ifthey export 70% (60% in the case
of the least-developed ACP States) of the
total value of the products covered by the
system to countries outside the
Community (Article 189(3)).
II A selective system
Stabex covers a specific list of
agricultural and tropical products
(excluding those in competition with
products from temperate regions), wood in
the rough, certain fisheries products and
products which have undergone first-stage
processing such as squared wood, cocoa
paste, cocoa butter, cocoa powder and
groundnut oil.
During the period covered by the first two
Conventions the list also included iron ore
and its derivatives, which were later
covered by Sysmin, a system set up under
Lome II.
The list of products covered by Stabex has
grown from 26 under Lome I to 44 under
Wood exports.
(Fidji)
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Lome II and 50 under Lome IV, which
includes all primary cocoa products, all
essential oils and the main cephalopods.
Under the fourth Convention it thus
covers virtually all the basic agricultural
products exported by the ACP countries
except those falling within the common
agricultural policy, sugar and meat, which
are the subjects of separate protocols, and
tobacco.
Coffee and cocoa, which had a negligible
role under Lome I, have gradually grown
since Lome II to account for the greater
part of the transfers.HOWSTA8EX
OPERATES
II
The financial
conditions of the
transfers
Under the first three Lome Conventions,
only transfers to the least-developed ACP
States were non-refundable grants.
Transfers to all the other ACP States were
loans which, under certain conditions, had
to be repaid to the system.
However, the conditions of repayment (the
purpose of which was to reconstitute
STABEX funds) were very favourable:
among other things, no interest was
charged and repayment could be deferred
ifnecessary.
Under Lome I, beneficiaries of transfers
had five years to contribute to the
reconstitution of the system's resources.
If repayments were not made by the
deadline, the Council of Ministers, taking
into consideration the situation and
outlook of the balance of payments,
exchange reserves and foreign debts of
the ACP States concerned, could decide
that the sums outstanding must be
reconstituted wholly or partially, in one or
more instalments, or could waive the right
to repayment.
Under Lome II and III, the conditions for
reconstituting the system's resources
were made more flexible: repayments
could be made in several annual
instalments or in the currency of the ACP
State concerned.
Under Lome IV the principle of beneficiary
countries reconstituting Stabex resources
was abandoned. This was one of the most
important innovations of the new
Convention. It eliminated the principle of
repayment of transfers, from which
hitherto only the least-developed States
had been exempt.
Since then, Stabex transfers have been
simply grants.
This adjustment proved necessary
because the system had not been
operating satisfactorily since Lome II.
The growing and worrying indebtedness of
the ACP countries made it impossible for
them to meet their obligations to help
reconstitute resources, which had
originally been imposed to give them a
greater sense of responsibility and ensure
the long-term survival of the system.
One has only to compare the amounts
transferred and the resources
reconstituted to see that this arrangement
fitted the situation very poorly. Of the
ECU 2 272 630 690 million of overall
resources between 1975 and 1988, only
ECU 214 361 373 million (less than 10%)
came from "reconstitution".1. Lome IV, Article 194(1) and (2).
2. Lome IV, Article 194(4):
'If, after the reduction referred to in
paragraph 2, the total amount of the
transfers which may give rise to a
payment exceeds the amount of
available resources, the Council of
Ministers shall evaluate the situation
on the basis of a Commission report
on the probable development of the
system and shall examine the steps to
be taken to remedy that situation,
within the tenns of the Convention."
Stabex is financed under the European
Development Fund.
It is non-programmable aid since the
amounts transferred cannot be predicted
in advance, unlike in the case of the
National Indicative Programmes (NIP).
Funding allocated to the system rose from
ECU 325 million for Lome I, to ECU 550
million for Lome II, to ECU 925 million for
Lome III and to ECU 1 500 million for the
first five years of application of Lome Iv.
The second Protocol to Lome IV brought
the allocation for that Convention up to
ECU 1 800 million, a 20% increase on the
amount provided for by the first Protocol.
In order to avoid all the funding being
used up too early, the total allocation for
each Convention was divided into five
annual instalments for equal amounts.
Any balance remaining at the end of one
year is automatically added on to the
instalment for the following year.
This funding has been supplemented by
the repayments of earlier transfers (Lome
I and Lome II) and interest earned by
Stabex funds in the financial market
(Lome III and IV).
Where resources have been insufficient,
advance use has generally been made of
up to 25% of the annual instalment for the
following year (the last year being the
exception).
If even this has not provided enough to
cover the transfers to be made, those
transfers are reduced by 10%.1
The funcling available is thus made up
ofthe following:
- anybalance remaining from the previous
year,
- the apnual instalment, which is I/5 ofthe
total allocated for afive-yearperiod,
- where necessary, the advance use ofup to
25% ofthe followingyears instalment,
- interest earned byinvestment in the
financial market ofthe annual instalment.
If there is an accumulation of
unfavourable circumstances likely to
exhaust the funds, the Council of
Ministers may decide, on the basis of a
report by the Commission, to reduce the
amount of the transfers and only partially
compensate the losses suffered by a
particular ACP State.
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Transfers may be made only if actual
export earnings in a given year are lower
than the reference level. This reference
level is derived from average export
earnings over the four preceding years
(Lome I , II and II), or over four out of the
six preceding years, excluding "extreme"
years (Lome IV).
The dependence
threshold
Stabex covers all the ACP countries, with
differentiated conditions of access
("thresholds") to take account of their
stage of development (Lome IV, Article
196).
Since Stabex only applies to products
which account for a significant proportion
of a country's export earnings, it was
necessary to set a dependence threshold
to determine the products eligible.
This threshold is defined in terms of the
export earnings of a given product to all
destinations during the application year
as a percentage of total earnings from
exports of all goods in the year preceding
that. This threshold has gradually been
lowered.
Under Lome I it was set at 7.5% (5% for
sisal) of export earnings on all goods
(2.5% for the least-developed, landlocked
and island (LLI) ACP States), under Lome
II at 6.5% (2% for LLI States), under
Lome III at 6% (1.5% for the LLI States)
and under Lome IV at 5% (1% for the LLI
States).
From one Convention to the next the
dependence threshold has thus been
progressively and significantly reduced to
allow the widest possible coverage of ACP
exports.
The situation of the least-advantaged
countries has been taken into account
because the Community wants to give
them preferential treatment and greater
protection.
fJ The "franchise"
system
Lome IV introduced a "franchise" system
whereby the ACP States show their
support for one another and the
Community. The "franchise" is analogous
to the amount retained by an insurance
company from the total amount for which
an insured partyis claiming.
The amount retained is 4.5% of the
reference level (1%for the LLI States).
However, it is limited to a certain
percentage of the loss of earnings: not
more than 20% for the least developed or
isolated countries and not more than 30%
for other ACP countries.
It is not applied at all in cases involving
amounts less than ECU 2 million for least-
developed ACP States or less than ECU
1million for the other ACP States.MECHANISMS AND
CONDITIONS OF ELIGIBILITY
II
The basis of
the transfer and the
amount ofthe transfer
The transfer is based on the difference
between the reference level and earnings
in the application year, minus the amount
of the "franchise".
These figures are calculated for each
product or group of products from each
ACP State in a given application year.
For a loss of earnings to qualify for a
transfer, it must not be the result of a
deliberate loss-incurring export policy of
an ACP State. (Article 202)
Only real losses of earning, including
those arising from the implementation of
voluntary restraint agreements on specific
products, give the countries concerned the
right to receive transfers.
Sometimes losses of earnings on exports
to the Community are offset by increased
earnings on exports to other destinations.
In such cases only the net loss of earnings
(all destinations) qualifies for
compensatorytransfers.
Where trends in production, total exports
or exports to the Community change
substantially, consultations take place
between the ACP State concerned and the
Commission to determine whether the
changes justify a reduction in the transfer
(Article 203).
1. Thanks to these simplifications, the
ACP States now merely need to tell
the Commission within three months
of the end of the application year:
- the value of their exports of all
categories of goods to all
destinations during the preceding
application year,
- the volume of each product
covered by the system marketed
during the application year,
- the volume and value of products
covered by the system exported
during the application year a) to all
destinations and (b) to the
Community.
II Management of
the system
Under the first three Conventions, the
statistics used to calculate the reference
level and the transfer basis were obtained
by cross-checking the export statistics of
the ACP States and Community statistics
on the same exports.
To make the system function more quickly
and reliably, it was agreed under Lome IV
to use only Eurostat (Statistical Office of
the European Communities) import
statistics as the basis of calculation.
The exclusive use of these statistics,
expressed in ecus, eliminates any
complication of the calculations by
exchange rate factors.!
Stabex is sometimes criticised, for
example for being discriminatory, since it
only benefits one group of countries.
This is a political decision which can be
explained naturally in terms of the special
historical and cultural links between
Europe and the ACP States.
The system is also criticised for directing
trade flows towards the European Union.
In fact none of the provisions of Stabex
prevents ACP States from selling their
products to other destinations.The review of the fourth Lome Convention
provided the, sometimes fraught, occasion
to take stock of Stabex in a particularly
straitened economic climate and then,
against that backdrop, to adjust the
mechanisms of an instrument which has
been the epitome of ACP-EEC cooperation
since its inception.
While Stabex's merits were underscored
afresh during Lome III, a number of
problems also came to light. The system
has had to cope with a dearth of funds due
to the steep slide in world prices for raw
materials like coffee and cocoa and to the
fact that needs cannot be forecast since a
decline in export earnings cannot by
definition be predicted.
The allocation of funds poses a further
problem, since the use of Stabex transfers
has since 1989 been the sole
responsibility of the ACP States. In the
discussions on Lome IV this free hand
was called into question by some EC
Member States who thought this could
encourage an ill-considered use of
resources that was difficult to justify
when structural adjustment policies
required tight management.
Effect Of the transfers
The system has often been likened to an
insurance policy against lean years. To
enable ACP States to carry out their
programming on a stable and predictable
basis, Stabex seeks to limit the adverse
effects of the earnings losses on exports
of certain products to the Community,
notably farm products.
The compensatory mechanism was
originally designed simply to inject funds
which would normally have come from the
market. The basic idea is that Stabex
transfers replace the amounts which
would have been paid to producers had
the market been normal, with those
earnings being used in accordance with
the producers' needs and habits.
But the transfer of compensatory
payments is not an end in itself. It is the
use to which Stabex funds are put that
matters.
As conceived, Stabex can have a positive
effect only in the way the transfers are
used.1, These procedures are also used for
any counterpart funds in na1ional
currency generated and managed in a
separate account. This happens
when the government sells the
products or services imported with
the foreign currency 1ransferred, or
the foreign currency itse~, to domestic
economic operators,
DEVELOPMENT
Of' SPtBEX
LomeI to Lome .flI: the objectives remain the same Transfers must be
used first and foremost to finance
programmes and projects aimed at
rehabilitating, maintaining or
strengthening a struggling sector. Stabex
must redound to the benefit of the
"victims" of a fall in export earnings, be
they involved in the production, the
marketing, the distribution or the
transport of the product concerned.
Only where appropriate, for example
where it can be demonstrated that a
sector is no longer viable, may Stabex
funds be used for the purposes of
diversifying production. Transfers are
then considered as assistance towards
converting to new activities.
Tighter controls Initially, the decision on how the funds
transferred were used was the sole
responsibility of the recipient country and
no explicit instructions were issued. So
long as no conditionality was attached to
the transfers, their effectiveness was
largely diluted. To remedy this,
monitoring of the allocation and actual
use of the funds, especially their
conformity with the system's objectives,
has been gradually strengthened over
successive Conventions.
At the beginning, under Lome I, the
recipient state merely had to produce a
report for the Commission on the use of
funds. Under Lome II, information was
required on the planned use of the funds,
plus a report on their actual use, before
the transfer agreement could be signed.
However, the transfer itself did not hinge
on thatinformation.
Things changed with Lome III. Each
recipient ACP State was then required to
give detailed information, along with the
transfer request, on the earnings lost and
on the programm,es and options to which
it undertook to allocate the funds in
keeping with Stabex objectives.
If funds are to be used in sectors other
than those suffering earnings losses, the
recipient country has to give reasons. The
transfer agreement may be signed only
once the Commission has received and
checked this information.
In practice, until 1989, funds were made
available through direct, undifferentiated
transfers. They were neither targeted nor
negotiated and the recipient country could
deploy them as it saw fit.
An important milestone was passed with
Lome IV: the recipients had to learn to see
Stabex not just a mechanism for easing
difficulties but as an instrument for
remedying them. Lome IV did away with
the principle of reconstitution, replacing it
with "frameworks of mutual
obligations».
Whilst maintaining the principle that
Stabex transfers belong exclusively to the
ACP States, this mechanism provides for
the use of the funds transferred to be
negotiated between the recipient state and
the Commission in each year of
application.
1. "·;i
FRAMEWORK OF
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::·~UTUALOBLIGATIONS ,
Funds transferred are now to be allocated
according to a framework of mutual
obligations (FMO) to be negotiated in each
case between the recipient state and the
Commission.
They go in the first place to the sector
experiencingthe drop in export earnings, for
the benefit of the economic operators
concerned or, where warranted, to other
productive sectors, mainlyagriculture.
Negotiation on a case-by-case basis is
conducted on the ground by the ACP state
authorities and the Commission delegate.
The latter keeps Member States'
representations regularly informed. The
FMO is based on the sectoral analysis and
policies and on the ACP state's proposals for
using the funds.
When an agreement is reached, the ACP
State and the Commission sign a protocol
setting out the framework of mutual
obligations and stating how the transfer is
to be used at the various stages of the
agreed projects (Article 210).
Timetable Appraisal of the dossiers, including
consultations between the ACP State and
the Commission to determine the amount of
the transfer, has to be completed on the
30 June following each year of application.
The Commission takes the transfer decision
by 31 July and the definitive amount is
notified to the ACP State.
Subject to the signing of a transfer
agreement, the amount may then be paid, in
ecus, into an account opened in an ED
Member State on behalf ofthe recipient ACP
State and bearinginterest for that state.
Two signatures, that of the ACP State and
that of the Commission, are required to
draw funds from thataccount.
In principle, therefore, the funds are
available to the ACP State at the latest
seven months after the year of application.
But in practice a number of factors
complicate and slow down utilisation of the
funds.
Although the Convention lays down a clear
timetable for payment of the funds, in terms
of their use and the establishment of an
FMO, itmerely recommends thatprocedures
be as simple as possible so that the
transfers can be put at the ACP States'
disposal as swiftly as possible.
Negotiation of an FMO entails considerable
effort for both sides and often takes several
months.
The FMO is not yet wholly accepted by the
recipient states which, whilst being
signatories to Lome IV; still do not see why
they should have to negotiate and justifythe
use ofthe funds.
It should be noted that a suspension clause
is attached to the FMO and payment of the
tranches to the ACP State hinges on
adherence to that clause. Moreover, some
countries have been slow to open accounts
in foreign currency.
Although the system can be slower, the new
formula has tightened it up and made it
more viable.
Stabex has returned to its roots. Itis right
that ACP producers should benefit from a
kind of insurance guaranteeing steady
earnings and encouraging them to supply
products which will earn their country the
foreign exchange it needs for its
development. The new system ensures
better allocation of the transfers and
contributes to a thoroughgoing restructuring
of productive sectors.
By dint of the FMOs and the dual-signature
accounts, the system makes it easier than
before to monitor and follow up the use of
the funds transferred.APPLICATION OF STABEX
BElWEEN 1991 AND 1994
Despite the shortage offunds, the amounts transferred have made amajorcontribution.
Particularly when lowmarketprices are compounded bylocal.difficulties in asector the drop
in earnings can be substantial and give rise to sizeable transfers.
The fall in world coffee and cocoa prices is certainly the chiefcause ofearnings losses
triggeringStabex transfers, and thus ofthe imbalances in the balance ofpayments, the
nationalbudget and the economy at large, and livingstandards suffer.
Experience has shown that one ofStabex's strongpoints is its ability to continue working in
periods when prices are in the doldrums and otherglobalregulatory instruments have failed.
II 1991 (1990 year of application)
1990 is the first year of application in which Stabex was governed by the provisions of the
fourth Lome Convention.
The Commission established 67 cases of eligible earnings losses.
The overall amount of the transfer bases was ECD 1 497 731184 after application of the
"franchise" (amount retained).
After consultations between the Commission and each ACP State concerned, the
reductions provided for in Article 203 brought this amount down to ECD 1378564 223.
Available ordinary resources amounted to only ECU 383 678 080 comprising:
-the annual allocation for financial year 1990: ECD 300 million,
-the 25% drawn on year of application 1991: ECU 75 million,
-amount of interest accumulated at 30 August 1991: ECU 8678080.
The ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors, mandated by the Council of Ministers, then
decided to top up those funds with an additional ECD 100 million, notably from the
unexpended balances of the fifth and sixth EDFs.
Coverage ofthe amounts eligible in the 1990 year of application was thus just under 40%, although in absolute
terms the amount committed (ECD 483.67 million) was a record high in the history of the
Stabex.
In the 1990 year of application the concentration of available funds on a very small
number of countries was less marked than in 1988 and 1989 but earnings losses due to
the fall in the price of coffee, and to a lesser degree the price of cocoa, are still
responsible for the bulk of transfers (67.5% and 15.9% of the total respectively).
!. ';;1\ ! Ie,.: ..i
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BETWEEN 1991 AND 1994
II 1992 (1991 year ofapplication)
In 1992 the ACP States requested the balance of earnings losses eligible under the 1980,
1981, 1987, 1988 and 1989 years of application during which transfers had had to be
reduced owing to a lack of funds.
But Stabex was still short of money so the ACP States opted to withdraw their request
and the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers agreed to consider the dossiers relating to earnings
losses in the years cited above definitively closed.
The ACP States had also asked the Community to make an exceptional gesture to cover in
whole or in part the ECU 757 million shortfall for 1990. There, too, the Kingston Council
of Ministers took note of the Community's position that the exercise relating to the
1990 year of application was closed.
For the 1991 year of application, the Commission established that 35 ACP states were
eligible for 67 transfers. The overall amount of the transfer bases after application of the
"franchise" amounted to ECU 1.366 million.
After the reductions under Article 203 (consultations), this amount was reduced to
ECU 1.062 million.
The systemsordinaryfinancial resources amounted to only ECU 316.5 million comprising:
- the annual tranche for 1991 reduced by 25% by the automatic drawing on this tranche
during the previous year (ECU 225 million),
- the amount of the 25% automatic drawing on the 1992 tranche pursuant to Article 194
(ECU 75 million),
- the amount of interest accumulated at 31 July 1992 pursuant to Article 192
(ECU 16.5 million).
As these funds were not sufficient to cover the overall amount of the transfer bases, the
latter were reduced by afurther 10% (Article 194) but still exceeded the sums available.
The ACP-EEC Committee of Ambassadors therefore decided to add an extra ECU 75
million by an exceptional drawing and reducing the annual tranche of the 1993 and 1994
years of application by ECU 37.5 million.
This brought overall Stabex resources for 1991 to ECU 391.5 million, which covered
around 40% of the eligible amounts.
As in the previous year, the concentration of funds on a very small number of countries is
falling off. Three countries received 10% to 19% of the aggregate transfers for all
recipient countries, 12 countries got 1% to 9% and 20 countries less than 1%.
Earnings losses due to very low world coffee and cocoa prices account for 81.7% of the
total transferred, ofwhich 64.09% for coffee and 17.61% for cocoa.APPL.ICATION OF SThBEX
BETWEEN 1991 AND 1994
II 1993 (1992 year of application)
The Community decided to extend by one year the spe"cial "all destinations" derogation
granted under Lome III to a number of ACP countries for an interim period of three years
corresponding to the 1990, 1991 and 1992 years of application. In principle, this
derogation expired on 31 December 1993.
The decision is justified by those countries' special circumstances, although the
derogation is already an exception to the principle of covering only exports to the EU. The
Community refused to extend this to the 1994 year of application as the ACP countries
wanted.
For the 1992 year of application the Commission ascertained that 32 ACP States were
eligible for 60 transfers.
The overall amount of the transfer bases after application of the "franchise" was ECU
1033 million, reduced to ECU 848029662 under Article 203.
The ordinary resources available amounted to ECU 330 million, comprising:
- the annual tranche for 1992 reduced by 25% by the automatic drawing on this tranche
the previous year (ECU 225 million),
- the amount of the 25% automatic drawing on the 1993 year of application
(ECU 75 million),
- the amount of accumulated interest at 31 July 1993 pursuant to Article 192
(ECU 30 million).
Following a further reduction of 10% (Article 194), the overall amount of the transfer
bases (ECU 763.2 million) still exceeded resources and it was not possible to reach a
Community consensus on mobilising additional funds.
The ACP countries found the EU offer unacceptable. Negotiations continued until January
1994 without any outcome. Failing an agreement on additional funds, the ACP States
finally accepted in February 1994 that the 1993 transfers be made on the basis of the
ordinary funds available (ECU 330 million).
As a result, coverage of the eligible amounts was 43.2%. Concentration of resources was
not much different from the previous year.
Three ACP countries received between 10% and 16% of the total transfers; 12 countries
between 1% and 9% and 17 countries less than 1%.
A number of changes were observed in the situation of individual products, however.
Whereas the fall in earnings due to a very low world price for coffee and cocoa still
accounted for the bulk of the transfers (76.28%), this portion was down on the previous
year (81.7%).
By contrast, the share of cotton climbed from 7.08% in the 1991 year of application to
14.25% the following year owing to the fall in world cotton prices.
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After three particularly difficult years, demands on Stabex eased significantly in 1994
with soaring commodity prices, an improvement which was to have an even greater
impact on the system the following year.
, For the 1993 year of application the Commission established that 36 ACP States were
eligible for 57 transfers.
The overall amount of transfer bases after application of the "franchise" amounted to ECU
663 million.
Available resources stood at ECU 285 million comprising:
- the annual tranche for 1993 reduced by 25% by the automatic drawing on that tranche
the previous year and reduced by 12.5% by the exceptional drawing on the 1991 year of
application (ECU 187.5 million),
- the amount of reso.urces (25 %) automatically made available in the instalment of the
1994 application year (ECU 75 million),
- the amount of interest accumulated at 30 June 1994 pursuant to Article 192 (ECU
22.5 million).
After the reductions following consultations (Article 203) and the 10% reduction under
Article 194, the total amount of transfer bases was reduced to ECU 473 million.
Available resources, namely ECU 285 million, covered 60.24% of the transfers, Le. 17%
more than in 1992.
For four countries the amount of transfers decided ranged from 10% to 16% of the total.
For 15 countries it ranged from 1%to 7% and for 17 others itwas below 1%.
Coffee accounted for 61.4% of the amounts to be transferred, followed by cocoa (18.7%).
Groundnut products (5.3%) and bananas (4.6%) assumed greater importance, while coffee
dipped from 14.2% in 1992 to 4.5% in 1993.
Execution of certain Stabex transfers approved since 1991 was suspended for several
ACP countries owing to the political situationthere.APPLICATION OF STABEX
BETWEEN 1991 AND 1994
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In 1995 Stabex resumed normal business.
For the 1994 year of application, 26 ACP
States received 30 transfers, the largest
going to two banana-exporting countries
in the Caribbean, where plantations had
been ruined by a drought or a cyclone.
The system benefited from firmer
commodity prices.
The total transferred was ECU 138
million, Le. less than the ECU 201.215
million in available resources for the 1994
year of application.
This meant that earnings losses were
covered in their entirety, something that
had never happened since the entry into
force of the Fourth Lome Convention.
Coverage rates were 40% for years of
application 1990, 1991 and 1992, and
around 60% for 1993.
The situation for individual products has
also changed radically: the two products
giving rise to the bulk of the transfers are
bananas (42.6%) and cotton (21.4%) with
cocoa and coffee slipping to third and
fourth positions at 16.4% and 8.8%
respectively.
The stabilisation of
export receipts in Mauritius
has helped build
the country's textile industry.,
This chapter gives some practical examples ofhowStabex resources are used
by implementing the frameworks ofmutual obligations. ,
Mauritania:
restructuring the
fisheries sector
For the first time the fourth Lome
Convention included fishery products,
such as cephalopods (squid, cuttlefish and
octopus) and shrimps, in the list of
products covered by Stabex. These two
categories alone account for a large share
of Mauritania's exports.
Since 1990 the performance of
Mauritania's fisheries sector, especially
cephalopod, has plummeted. This can be
put down to non-rational exploitation of
fish resources, a decline in fishing effort
because of the sector's financial
difficulties and the parlous state of its
equipment. In addition, structural
problems call for the sector's·
reorganisation. The Government has
accordingly adopted a set of far-reaching
adjustment reforms.
Following the drop in the quantity and
value of its octopus exports, Mauritania
received a transfer of ECU 9.58 million for
Stabex 1990. The corresponding FMO
was signed in June 1992 and the first
payment made in the course of the same
year. Itprovides for:
1.A sectoral import programme (SIP),
mainly covering inputs, spare parts,
cowlings and insurance for vessels.
2. Eight studies on the Mauritanian
fisheries sector, the results of which
largely determined the utilisation of
counterpart funds generated by the SIP.
These studies mainly concerned ways of
ensuring the monitoring of shipowners by
the Central Bank of Mauritania, stepping
up customs and sea surveillance and
support for the National Centre for
Oceanographic Research and Fisheries
(CNROP).
3. An innovative financing system
designed to encourage the development of
the Mauritanian private sector, whereby
the Central Bank grants credit to banks
which then lend to private shipowners.
The loans are guaranteed by equivalent
amounts deposited in Treasurybonds.
For 1991 Mauritania received a Stabex
transfer of ECU 4.9 million for
cephalopods. The corresponding FMO
was signed in September 1993. The first
tranche of new resources was mobilised.
after a final positive evaluation of
implementation of the 1990 FMO.
The counterpart funds generated by the
1991 Stabex SIP were used to step up
measures already taken using CPFs from
the previous SIP. "-
The 1991 Stabex FMO also provides the
Central Bank's markets and exports
department with technical assistance to
improve the system for monitoring and
analysing commercial transactions.
The 1990 and 1991 Stabex FMO
constituted the first steps towards a
programme to restructure the fisheries
sector in Mauritania. This process is
continuing and is being stepped up with
state withdrawal from the sector's
productive activities, the liberalisation of
different export sectors and the gradual
introduction of a licensing system for
demersal and pelagic fishing.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
In 1992 Mauritania received a Stabex
transfer of ECU 0.825 million which could
be used to finance a project to strengthen
the industrial fisheries department of the
Ministry of Fisheries and Maritime
Economy, which would to some extent
determine the use made of the ECU
1.01 million transfer decided for 1994.
Exploitation ifiron are
in Mauritania is the main area
ofStabex intervention
in the country_
Guinea-Bissau:
revitalising the mango
andpolm sectors
A project to promote mango exports is
designed to revitalise national production.
It includes the introduction of varieties of
higher commercial value, a longer
production period, support for internal
and external trade circuits, a boost to the
fruit processing sectors and the
establishment of a legal framework
conducive to exports.
The budget for this operation, which was
completely used up at the end of 1994,
was FF 176 321.70 financed by Stabex in
1986 and ECU 123 265 from 1991 Stabex
resources. An extension is planned for
1992 Stabex. Another project totalling
ECU 990 000 involves replacing old palm
trees nationwide.
The aim is to improve production
gradually by introducing new varieties,
improving the associated crop system and
the performance of processing chains.
The project is entirely implemented by
national technicians who provide both
small farmers and the owners of medium-
sized plantations with plants and
technical advice. An extension of the
project is planned using 1992 Stabex
resources.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
Cote
d'ivoire .
producer support
The COte d'Ivoire accounted for over a
quarter of total Lome III Stabex transfers
and about 18% of total Stabex transfers in
the first three application years of Lome
IV (1990-92), essentially for coffee and
cocoa.
The FMO procedure was introduced in
Lome IV at the beginning of 1990 and the
Cote d'Ivoire 1990 FMO was one of the
first signed in all the ACP States.
Coffee and cocoa, the mainstays of the
Ivorian economy, generated the major
development surge of the 1970s and
1980s. These sectors have always been
tightly controlled by the authorities via
the powerful Caisse de Soutien des Prix
des Produits Agricoles (CSSPPA) the
main purpose of which was to stabilise
prices to producers but which rapidly
assumed control of the whole sector.
As long as world prices held up, the
policies applied had a positive effect on
production and economic development.
However, after a period of sustained
growth, the system was no longer able to
cope with the drop in world prices from
1986. The result was a general economic
recession and a sharp rise in budget
deficits. The guaranteed prices to
producers were at first maintained, which
ruined public finances, then were slashed
by halfin 1989.
The period from July 1989, when a
government stabilisation plan came into
effect, to January 1994, when the CFA
franc was devalued,' was a financial
catastrophe. This was when the first
large Lome IV Stabextransferwas made.
It is essential to reactivate the Ivorian
financial system, in.which the state plays
a prominent role, and to do this donors
must first tackle the Treasury's lack of
liquidity. Apart from French aid, Stabex
transfers are the main intervention
instrument.
Part of the problem is that production is
in the hands of a whole host of small
planters who need to be paid cash when
they deliver their harvest. Someone has
to put forward the money. Normally it is
the exporters who do this but the crisis is
deep-seated. The banks no longer want to
lend and exporters are heavily indebted.
Without cash, small farmers tend to stop
growing crops and tumto other activities.
Targeted measures
The European Union targeted funds where
operators had debts and setup procedures
to ensure that these funds were disbursed
swiftly. The priority was to pay arrears
and thus rebuild confidence. The chain
began to work again, helped along by a
guarantee fund.
The 1990 and 1991 Stabex FMO
measures were essentiallyused:
a) to support the restructuring of the
coffee/cocoa sectors by:
• paying the CSSPPA's arrears to banks,
factories and marine insurance;
• financing a redundancy and retraining
programme for 400 CSSPPA officials
designed to reduce running costs;
• financing a guarantee fund to facilitate
access to the banking system for
cooperative groups (GVC). By 23 June
1994 CFAF 3 700 million had been used to
finance 100 producer organisations as a
result of this guarantee fund. The
operation, which was sorely need by the
GVC, has therefore been a success;
• contributing to the financial equilibrium
of the 1992-93 coffee/cocoa marketing
year by means of a transfer to the
CSSPPA;EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
b) to improve the living conditions of
producers hit by the fall in export
earnings;
c) to support agricultural diversification;
d) to contribute to reforestation measures
and betterforestry management.
In return the Government undertook:
• to continue the restructuring policies for
the coffee/cocoa sectors by settling the
last of the CSSPPA debts and
consolidating the liberalisation of
domestic marketing;
• to pursue restructuring policies for the
wood, cotton and rubber sectors;
• to implement an environmentally sound
forestry policy.
For a long time Stabex payments were
blocked because the conditions for
reforms had not been met. Initially,
therefore, macroeconomic rather than
direct producer support was provided.
When the situation improved, Stabex
transfers resumed their original role of
providing producers with targeted aid.
The process of bringing the coffee/cocoa
sectors under control continues. At this
stage, the European Union's measures
appear to be successful. The situation
has been straightened out and the state is
no longer in control of domestic
marketing. A World Bank programme
which pursued the same objective proved
of little effect.
Banana exports,
Nieky, west ofAbidjan.
(Cote d'lvoire)Coffee production
(Cameroon), and
in Tanzania (p.26)
one ofthe commodities
covered since Stahex
was created in J915.
Cameroon·
"chequesfor
planters"
As in the previous three years, coffee and
cocoa export earnings dropped because of
lowerworld prices.
In 1990, as a result of past management,
the Office National de Commercialisation
des Produits de Base (ONCPB) ceased
payment of tens of thousands of planters.
Since then the coffee and cocoa sectors
have suffered a serious crisis with a sharp
drop in output and quality. As the
principle of an economy based on state-
managed, regulated sectors had
demonstrated its limitations, the
Government, with the help of the
Community, began a far-reaching
restructuring of the coffee and cocoa
sectors aimed at liberalisation and a
greater role for private operators.
The state proceeded to wind up the
ONCPB and replaced it temporarily with a
more flexible structure, the ONCC.
Stabex, in conjunction with the other
donors, undertook to support the
government's policy and funds were
directed at a more structural utilisation
than in the past. Initially Stabex
contributed to the partial settlement of
the ONCPB's enormous debts, a vital
precondition for the sector's recovery. To
r-,,"·~."=,",:,=~,:;=::: __~,,"= that end, a special unit was set up to
implement Stabex.
Stabex helped to cover the redundancy
- payments of ONCPB staff and several
other parastatals involved in the coffee
and cocoa sectors. The most spectacular
and easily the most successful measure
was its contribution to paying off the
ONCPB's and the sector's debts to small
planters, an operation known as "cheques
! ""=..u"",,~.,~--=> for planters".
The first payments were made through
bodies which in the past had been
responsible for collecting production
before delivery to the state body (ONCPB).
As the system had run into difficulties,
the Delegation, with the aid of the Stabex
unit, set up the "cheques for planters"
operation whereby small planters were
paid direct by a cheque made out to them
personally.
The operation was complex and risky but
it proved to be highly successful. Mobile
payment counters were used throughout
the operation to make out and distribute
over 50 000 cheques to small planters.
The money was mainly spent on a few
specific areas: collection of loans,
education, health, farming, investment in
trade and stockfarming and to a much
lesser extent, savings.
In 1992-93, once Stabex had finished
contributing to settling past debts, it
began to play an active part in reviving
the competitiveness of the coffee and
cocoa sectors by: rehabilitating farm
tracks, providing information on market
prices, encouraging farms to diversify,
supporting macroeconomic reform and
reactivating financing for the sector.
The results of the 1995-96 marketing year
reflect the positive effects of this policy: a
significant increase in the share paid to
farmers, a record cocoa harvest and very
large increases in the output of arabica
and robusta coffee.
Future Stabex operations in the context of
1992/93 and 1994 FMO will be targeted
at improving the competitiveness of
Cameroon's products and raising theEFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
Drying cocoa, one of
the principal Stabex
products. (Chana)
average quality of products by means of
accompanying measures to consolidate
liberalisation in these sectors. Operations
which are starting up or due to get under
way in the short term include: continued
rehabilitation of rural infrastructure, help
with renewing plantations, strengthening
producer associations, improving the
market prices information system and
simplifying export procedures.
Central
African
Republic:
reimbursingfanners
Since independence the production and
marketing of robusta coffee has borne the
brunt of mismanagement and state
interventionist policies. At the end of the
1980s and the beginning of the 1990s a
deep recession set in.
The sector is structurally weak, and as in
other African producer countries, it was
also hit by the drop in world prices. The
result was a constant fall in coffee
exports, the third biggest sector after
diamonds and cotton.
Following the collapse of earnings from
1988 to 1993, the government, urged by
donors, gradually began restructuring the
coffee sector as part of structural
adjustment programmes.
The FMOs negotiated between the
Commission and the Central African
Republic since 1990 have helped a
bankrupt sector to recover. The state,
after much hesitation, confirmed its
withdrawal from the operational and
marketingaspects of production.
The combined effects of the devaluation of
the CFA franc in January 1994, the pick-
up in world coffee prices and liberalisation
of the sector have resulted in a rise in
production in three years from 8 000
tonnes to 16 000 tonnes of marketable
coffee and a considerable improvement in
quality.
Rebuilding trust.
For the farmers the most important
impact of the Stabex FMO was that they
were paid the arrears owed them by the
parastatal price stabilisation board
(CAISTAB) afteritwas wound up.
This operation was part ofwell-publicised,
far-reaching programme to settle
outstanding arrears to private operators
(producers, purchasers, exporters).
The Central African Minister for
Agriculture and the head of the
Commission Delegation made extensive
trips into the producer regions in Basse-
Koto and Lobaye to reimburse every
farmer direct. The farmers were paid in
cash on presentation of certified accounts
showing their claim with CAISTAB. As a
result of this operation the sector's
financial capacity was increased in 1993
and 1994 and, above all, it helped small
farmers to regain confidence and invest in
improving their plantations.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER L.OME IV
Tanzania:
direct aid to coffee
producers
Coffee production
(Tanzania).
Until 1994 Stabex transfers to Tanzania
were essentially linked to the decline in
the coffee sector as a result of the drop in
world prices, mismanagement of the
sector, deterioration of infrastructure and
the age and disease of plants.
In 1993 the support programme for the
agricultural sector revealed that the
crucial problem was that payments to
coffee planters were both incomplete and
unpredictable. In recent years planters
had received only about 50% of the export
value of their coffee. The result was a
vicious circle which jeopardised both the
quality and quantity of output.
The 1990 Stabex FMO, signed in October
1992, coincided with renewed discussion
about the state-controlled marketing
system and its ineffectiveness. The FMO
provided backing for reforms aimed at
liberalisation.
Transfers for application year 1990 were
intended for:
• the purchase of spare parts and other
equipment urgently needed by the coffee
sector,
• financing a GIP, with the resulting
counterpart funds allocated to the coffee
sector,
• technical assistance for the sector.
The 1991 Stabex FMO continues to
provide support for government reforms.
It contributes to macroeconomic
stabilisation by providing foreign
exchange for imports and to the coffee
sector by providing technical assistance,
spare parts, transport, encouraging the
use of inputs, supporting producer prices
and promoting research.
A wide-ranging operation.
Direct compensatory transfers were an
essential component of 1990 and 1991
Stabex interventions. These payments
were swift, sizeable and organised in an
efficient and transparent manner.
They were a resounding success: under
1990 and 1991 Stabex, some 410 000 and
430 000 farmers respectively - most of
Tanzania's coffee producers - received
compensatory payments under Stabex.
Farmers used the payments to purchase
food, inputs for the coffee sector and to
pay for school expenses.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
Sisal is one ofthe Madagascan
products covered by Stabex.
(Madagascar)
Madagascar:
focus on the quality
ofproducts
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Here again the fall in export earnings is
due to the drop in world coffee prices.
The problems of other products such as
vanilla (Madagascar is the biggest
producer), cloves and essential oils are
mainly the result of increased world
competition and in the case of vanilla, a
deterioration in quality and an increase in
Indonesian output.
The 1991-93 FMOs amount to ECU 3S
million. This is being used in conjunction
with IMF and World Bank operations to
contribute to the Malagasy government's
efforts to restructure public finances as
part of a structural adjustment
programme. More specifically, the
European Commission is helping the
government to ensure budget investment
in health, education, road maintenance
and implementation of sectoral policies in
these three areas.
The "SAVA" programme.
An ECU 12 million FMO, i.e. one third of
1991-93 available transfers, was
mobilised outside the structural
adjustment context. It is being used for
essentially traditional agricultural sectors
and for making areas where these crops
are produced more accessible. The
programme follows the overall economic
reform strategy and focuses particularly
on developing the full range of export
products.
The area targeted, in the north-east of the
country, is the Sambava-Andapa-Vohemar-
Antalaha (SAVA) region which alone
accounts for 80% of national vanilla
production and 20% of coffee production.
It also produces pepper and raffia. The
FMO is innovative because it has set up
an association bringing together all the
region's operators (planters, preparers,
collectors, packers, exporters). This
association, the "Groupement des
Entreprises de la Region de SAVA", is in
charge of a programme to reactivate
export systems and put them on a more
professional footing. Technical assistance
and a special fund will be set up.
The aim of the operation is improve
quality and adopt an organic approach. In
the future a MADAGASCAR label will be
created.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
Plantation ofyoung cotton
trees in Uganda.
Cotton is widely produced
byACP nations and has
received considerable support
from Stabex.
Uganda:
a "first" in the
coffee sector
In 1991 coffee accounted for over 75% of
Uganda's export revenue. The constant
fall in prices has substantially reduced
government resources.
Donors backing Uganda hold it up as a
model in terms of its economic
performance. It was considered more
effective to allocate a large part of foreign
exchange resources in the form of a GIP
to reviving the national economy than
direct aid to loss-making sectors.
Agreements have, however, been
concluded with the government whereby
the counterpart funds generated by these
import programmes are used for
budgetary purposes and primarily
allocated to the agricultural sector for
diversifying output and restructuring the
coffee and cotton sectors.
The emphasis has been on improving
quality and developing research activities
in these sectors. The Stabex funds made
available to Uganda in 1991 were used to
by a department of CIRAD to set up an in
vitro culture laboratory there. It initially
benefited from a coffee plant
micropropagation technology transfer. Six
clones of coffea canephora were transferred
to the laboratory and the multiplication
phase has begun. The experiment has
been hailed as a world first.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
Caribbean
and Pacific
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Stabex transfers are very useful
throughout the Caribbean which is
economically dependent on a small
number of export products (bananas,
cocoa, coffee, coconut, nutmeg and mace,
coffee, essential oils) and at the mercy of
extreme climatic conditions.
Under Lome IV transfers have mainly
been used to help four banana-producing
countries in the Wmdward Islands: Saint
Lucia, Saint Vmcent and the Grenadines,
Dominica and Grenada.
At the beginning of the 1990s, banana
export revenue in these countries fell
dramatically. The sector lost one third of
its European market share to other ACP
competitors and the dollar zone.
The main characteristic of the banana
industry in the Windward Islands is the
large number of small farmers (82% of
farms are smaller than 5 acres, 13% from
5 to 10 acres and only 4% of farms are
over 10 acres).
Lome IV Stabex FMOs have two main
objectives:
1. Supportfor refonn ofthe banana sector.
This involves:
A. -improving farmers' competitiveness
by increasingyields on smaller areas,
- reducing production costs, which are
very high in the Caribbean,
- improving the marketing and
financial management systems of
producer associations and marketing and
transport organisations.
In order to regain their lost share of the
European market, particularly in the UK,
the Windward Islands must focus on
quality and closing the price gap with
their competitors. Major restructuring is
called for, especially since the preferential
arrangements expire in 2002.
B. -offsetting the social implications of
reform. Restructuring is essential but it
will inevitably lead to a reduction in the
number of farmers. Only the most capable
farmers who are able to apply reforms and
compete at international level will
survive.
In this period of transition from a
traditional banana economy to a more
competitive economy, poorer farmers must
be given help. Stabex makes a significant
contribution to conversion aid and greater
social protection.
2. Supportfor economic diversification.
This implies diversification in the broad
sense, which is not confined to the
agricultural sector but covers tourism,
agro-industry, services and all areas
where these countries enjoy major
advantages.
Since US aid and aid from certain EU
Member States is gradually being
withdrawn the European Commission is
becoming an increasingly important
partner in the region.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER LOME IV
Dominica:
training
1 SOO banana
planters in modern
techniques
~.
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Agriculture is the mainstay of Dominica's
economy and the bulk of its export
revenue comes from bananas. Production
costs are not competitive however.
As part of a general programme to
development the banana industry, the
1990 and 1991 Stabex FMO (ECU
673 209 and ECU 158 647 respectively)
provide support for a government project
to improve the sector's productivity and
quality.
The challenge ofcompetitiveness
One of the priorities is to provide support
for 1 500 small banana planters selected
by the Dominica Banana Marketing
Corporation (DBMC) for their good
performance and high motivation. In
normal circumstances they produce 80%
of banana output.
The project enables them to build farm
sheds to package bunches of the fruit
using the latest techniques. This type of
packaging is highly appreciated by
European importers.
The farmers receive equipment and
technical assistance. The aim is to enable
them to supply better quality fruit with a
smaller percentage of rejects and hence
obtain higher earnings.
There should be a major impact on export
earnings with favourable repercussions on
the island's economy as it will be able to
consolidate its market share in Europe.
1990 and 1991 Stabex transfers (ECU
831 856) should generate counterpart
funds in the local currency (Eastern
Caribbean dollars) which will be used to
cover project expenses.
Keeping up efforts
Dominica, however, still faces serious
problems as a result of the combined
effects of the drop in prices and natural
disasters.
The financial situation of the industry is
deteriorating despite drastic cost-cutting
measures taken by the DBMC, with a 48%
reduction in employees in the sector. Loss
of earnings has forced many farmers to
leave the sector. It is vital to prevent a
drop in banana export revenue as this
could give rise to major macroeconomic
imbalances.
The aim of 1992 and 1993 Stabex
transfers (ECU 1 225 825 and ECU
3 368 793 respectively) is:
• to help repair the damage caused to the
bananaindustryby cyclone Debbie;
• to complete the plan to improve the
productivity and quality of the banana
industry by continuing assistance to 1 500
selected farmers to build fruit packaging
sheds. The aim is to raise the yield of
bananas on 7 500 acres from 5 to .
6 tonnes in 1993 to 10 to 12 tonnes in
1995 and to obtain a marked improvement
in quality.
The operation should also help other
sectors such as oranges, mangoes and
avocados.
The project includes improving road
access to 1 500 farms, a better system of
production credit for farmers, improving
water drainage infrastructure and soil
protection methods.i
.'
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Spices (Grenada)
and the fishing industry
in Barbados,
have received sizeable
Stabex support.
The transfers will also be used:
• to limit the adverse social impact of
restructuring;
• to take steps to restore farmers'
incomes;
• to help farmers convert to other
agricultural activities and carry out
projects/activities as part of the
diversification programme.
These objectives are in keeping with
Dominica's medium and long-term
strategy for a more competitive banana
industIy and agricultural diversification.EFFECTIVE USE OF
FUNDS UNDER L.OME IV
Vanuatu·
improving .
the road network
Copra is
the main Pacific
product
benefiting
from Stabex.
(Vanuatu)
The 1988-91 FMO totalling ECU
4 907 727 signed in 1993 is designed to
offset fluctuations in copra prices - and
also to a lesser extent cocoa prices - on
the world market. Over half this budget
will be put towards improving rural road
infrastructure on several islands. The aim
is to facilitate the transport of export
products and improve the quality of rural
life to encourage people not to leave their
villages.
The programme includes four sub-projects:
• reconstruction of Sarasota bridge on
Santo Island, of vital importance in the
island's road network;
• construction of a 19 km rural road on
Pentecost Island;
• construction of two roads on Ambae
Island. They were opened in 1995.
• improvement of Tanna's road network.
Works began in mid-November 1995.ANNEXES
D List of products covered by the Stabex
(Lome IV)
. groundnuts
- groundnut oil
- cocoa beans
- cocoa husks, shells and skins and
other waste
- cocoa paste
- cocoa butter
- cocoa powder
- raw or roasted coffee
- extracts, essences and concentrates
of coffee
- cotton not carded or combed
- cotton linters
- coconuts
- copra
- coconut oil
- palm oil
- palm kernel oil
. palm nuts and kernels
- raw hides and skins
- leather of bovine animals
- sheep and lamb skin leather
- goat and kid skin leather
- wood in the rough and squared wood
- sawn wood
- fresh bananas
- dried bananas
- tea
- raw sisal
- vanilla
. cloves
- wool not carded or combed
- fine animal hair of angora goat -mohair
- gum arabic
- pyrethrum; saps and extracts
of pyrethrum
- essential oils
- sesame seed
- pepper
- shrimps and prawns
- squid, octopus and cuttlefish
- cotton seed
- oil cake
. rubber
- peas
- beans
- lentils
- nutmeg and mace
- shea nuts
- shea nut oil
- mangoes
- karakul skinsANNEXES
fJ Acronyms used in the brochure on Stabex
UNCTAD: United Nations Conference on trade and Development
DC Developing countries
LDC's Leased developed countries, landlocked or island countries
EDF European Development Fund
ECSO European Communities Statistics Office
MOF Mutual obligations framework
NOFRC National Oceanographic and Fisheries Research Centre
(Mauritania)
CSSPPA Caisse de Stabilisation et de Soutien des Prix des Produits Agricoles
(Agricultural Price Stabilisation Board) (Cote d'Ivoire)
ONCPB Office National de Commercialisation des Produits de Base
(Agricultural Products Marketing Board) (Cameroon)
ONCC Office National du Cafe et du Cacao
(Cocoa and Coffee Board) (Cameroon)
CAISTAB: C~sse para-etatique de Stabilisation des Prix
(Parastatal body for agricultural price stabilisation)
(Central African Republic)
DBMC Dominica Banana Marketing Corporation
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